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## Language Planning and Identity Planning\*

### INTRODUCTION

A few years ago both terms in the above title would have been novel. Neither language nor identity was commonly thought of as an object of planning. The attempts of governments to manipulate these phenomena would have seemed too unsystematic, too natural or too nefarious to merit the word 'planning'. Today, only one of these terms is unusual: identity planning. Language has become widely subjected to deliberate, systematic policy-making, and one eminent sociolinguist (Haugen 1966:9) has written that there is 'a mushrooming of language planning in our times'. Beyond this, the regulation of language practiced from time immemorial has become recognized as an important kind of activity. 'Language planning' is now named by some scholars and policy-makers as their field of specialization, and there is an increasing volume of publications explicitly in this field.<sup>1</sup>

If language planning has grown so common and so noticed, identity planning must be considered as well, because language and identity are interrelated. Many scholars believe that identity influences language, and many believe that language influences identity. If these beliefs are true, then the following conclusions make sense:

- (1) Since language affects identity, an increase in language planning means that planners are having an increasing effect on identity. In other words, identity planning (whether deliberate or not) is increasing.
- (2) Since good planning takes account of side effects, language planners should study the effects of planned linguistic change on identity.
- (3) Since identity affects language, language planners should study identity planning as a means of accomplishing their goals.

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(4) Since language affects identity, those wanting to influence identity should consider language planning as a means.

(5) Those wishing to foil the efforts of language planners should consider using identity, and those wishing to foil the efforts of identity planners should consider using language, to accomplish their aims.

All of these conclusions call for a knowledge of how language and identity, and particularly how changes in language and identity, interact. In addition, it is important to know what aspects or types of language and what aspects or types of identity are related. Finally, a knowledge of how susceptible language and identity each are to manipulation would be needed to determine how useful the planning of one is in affecting the other. Let us look at each of these questions in turn.

#### LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY: THE MECHANISMS OF INTERACTION

Let us suppose that in a certain society there are several groups of people who agree on the question of who belongs to which group. In addition to this societal identity consensus, let us further suppose that the members of each group normally speak a language peculiar to that group alone or at least differentiating that group from each of the others in that society. In such a society, what happens to someone whose language or identity changes? If we consider a member of group A, designated  $M_a$ , who normally speaks the characteristic language of that group, designated  $L_a$ , we want to know what happens when  $M_a$  either acquires competence in  $L_b$ , loses competence in  $L_a$ , begins to identify himself as a member of B or ceases to identify himself as a member of A.

The effects of such a change will take place in several steps. To illustrate, consider the first change mentioned:  $M_a$  acquires a knowledge of  $L_b$ . One effect of this change is that  $M_a$  increases his resemblance to the members of B; if for no other reason, this is true because they now share a characteristic previously not shared: competence in  $L_b$  (cf. Stewart 1968:540). A second effect may be that  $M_a$  thinks increasingly like the members of B; if different languages differentially influence the thinking of their speakers, as has been hypothesized (Whorf 1956), becoming a speaker of a different language would change the way one thinks. Thirdly, becoming competent in  $L_b$  might well cause a person to want that competence justified; this would be the case especially when  $L_b$  is a minority language not generally valued by the members of A and a knowledge of it is not considered worth any effort by these members in general.

Or, if the third change mentioned above were to come about —  $M_a$  begins

to identify himself as a member of B – other effects would be predictable as a first step. For one thing, self-identification would lead to identification by others, since people often treat a person as the authority in defining his own identity. In addition,  $M_a$  would be expected to increase his liking for B once he begins to consider it his own group. Further, it would be natural for  $M_a$  to want to learn  $L_b$ , since he would have begun to regard it as his group's language.

Whether the initial change is a language change or an identity change, its first-step effects will in their turn have effects at step two; those will have effects at step three, etc. If, for example,  $M_a$ 's new competence in  $L_b$  causes him to want to justify that competence, this desire for justification may make him increase his volume of communication with members of B, since this will make his linguistic competence useful. Or, if a change of identity toward membership in B causes him to like B more, this liking may in turn lead him to surround himself more with members of B, which would increase the attractiveness of his social environment.

Naturally, the sequential effects of a single change can multiply and become very complex in the course of a few steps. If the average number of identifiable effects at each step is  $n$ , then the total number of effects by step  $s$  is about  $\sum_{i=1}^s n^i$ . Four effects at each step will yield 340 effects by the end of the fourth step, for example. The effects can go in two directions between any two variables and can go in circles around sets of three or more variables.

Figure 1 begins to show the complexity involved. It portrays hypothesized relationships between pairs of variables, out of a set of 18 variables, including those relationships just discussed. A total of 78 (out of a possible 306) hypotheses are shown in the figure. Each one is indicated by an arrow pointing from one variable ( $x$ ) to another ( $y$ ). Each arrow can be read: 'The more  $x$ , the more  $y$ .' The arrow from variable 11 to variable 17, for example, indicates the hypothesis: 'The more  $M_a$  is surrounded by B, the more  $M_a$  knows B.' As can be seen, the relationships within the figure include circular ones, and the language competence and personal identity variables (1 and 3) are linked in both directions through a variety of paths.

Even so, the figure understates the complexity. It leaves out any relationships between one of the 18 variables and some variable other than the 18, such as the number of languages known by  $M_a$  or  $M_a$ 's age or sex or wealth. Further, the hypothesized relationships are specified only as to precedence ( $x$  affects  $y$ , rather than  $y$  affects  $x$ ) and direction (the more the  $x$ , the more the  $y$ , rather than the less the  $y$ ) but are not qualified as to the strength of the relationship, the variabilities of the relationship across different degrees or rates of change (linearity and curvilinearity) or time lags between a change in  $x$  and the predicted change in  $y$ .





Figure 1. Hypothesized relationships linking language and identity

The final simplification in this figure is that only bivariate relationships are shown:  $x$  affects  $y$ . Multivariate relationships also exist, of course, and they are potentially much larger in number. Consider, for example, the arrow from variable 7 to variable 8. This represents the hypothesis that the better a member of one group knows the second group, the more he will tend to see himself as resembling the members of the second group. This hypothesis, advanced by Shibutani and Kwan (1965:578), is based on the explicit assumption that ethnic groups are more similar in reality than in their reciprocal perceptions. Thus increased familiarity is believed to lead to increased realism, which will imply increased understanding of the basic similarity between ethnic groups. If, however, we were to bring this assumption into the hypothesis, it might be portrayed as follows:



This could be verbalized as 'the more  $M_a$  resembles  $M_b$ 's, the more it will be true that, the more  $M_a$  knows B, the more  $M_a$  sees himself as resembling  $M_b$ 's'. Then, if  $M_a$ 's actual resemblance to  $M_b$ 's is low enough, an increase in familiarity with B will cause a decrease, rather than an increase, in  $M_a$ 's perception of a resemblance.

Another example is the relationship between variable 11 and variable 13. It might seem that physical proximity to members of B would make it advantageous to  $M_a$  to form coalitions with them. A coalition, here, includes any community of interest, such as a voluntary association, political party, pressure group, economic enterprise or even conjugal family. Physical proximity itself provides a basis for a geographically defined coalition and also makes negotiation over the division of rewards easier. On the other hand, differences in characteristics between  $M_a$  and the members of B (variable 4), combined with an inability to communicate with them (variable 10), have been hypothesized to bring them into even more conflict when

they are together than when apart, thus reversing the expected relationship (Deutsch 1966:125–126).

Even more multivariate relationships can be hypothesized involving additional variables outside the present figure. Contact between  $M_a$  and B (variable 11), for example, has been often hypothesized to lead to positive feelings towards B (variable 16) only under conditions of equality between the statuses of  $M_a$  and the members of B with whom he is in contact (Allport 1958:261–263). Age is another outside variable that probably affects the relationships shown in the figure. Communication with members of group B may make it easier for  $M_a$  to learn  $L_b$  (variable 2 affects variable 12), but this relationship seems to be stronger among the young than the old. Age also contributes attitudes which can alter the impact of language learning: as  $M_a$  grows older, he perceives competition between groups A and B, such as competition for jobs. This could be hypothesized to make a new justification for language learning possible: I have learned  $L_b$  in order to compete more successfully against B. Hence early language learning may contribute to interethnic solidarity, while those who learn  $L_b$  later in life may need to defend their acquisition of the language by emphasizing its instrumentalism and their own dislike for the members of B (Arutiunian 1972–1973:338, 343, 345–347). By now it should be clear that the figure represents only a subset of the plausible hypotheses linking the acquisition of competence in the language of another group with the adoption of an identity as member of that group.

By a simple transformation, the figure can be taken to represent a different, though related, set of hypotheses.  $L_b$  is changed to  $L_a$ ,  $M_b$  to  $M_a$  and B to A wherever they occur. Then the generalizations are rephrased: 'The less  $x$ , the less  $y$ '. An example: The less  $M_a$  forms coalitions with  $M_a$ s, the less  $M_a$  identifies himself as an  $M_a$ . The hypotheses in this set relate the loss of knowledge of the language of one's own group with the loss of one's original group identity. The two sets of hypotheses are not really the same; for movement in the direction of group B does not imply an equal amount of movement away from group A. The obvious example is that persons can become bilingual, learning  $L_b$  without forgetting  $L_a$ . There is more controversy about whether persons can also become 'bi-identical': some think that double identities are quite possible, but others reject this view. In either case, it is clearly possible to lose one's identity as a member of group A without assuming a group B identity. Thus there is no way to deduce one set of hypotheses from the other.

The assumptions stated earlier included a coincidence of language groups and identity groups. The hypotheses in the figure are intended to apply to

individuals living in a society where this assumption holds. If, however, large numbers of individuals made changes at the same time in variable  $x$ , would the same results be expected? Suppose, for example, a massive linguistic assimilation took place by members of A, who adopted  $L_b$  wholesale. Some of the hypotheses would seem to retain their reasonableness: communication with B would be facilitated by the learning of  $L_b$ , regardless of how many others learned it. Other hypotheses, however, would lose their rationale: the need to justify learning  $L_b$  would disappear if it were a mass assimilation; and a person forgetting  $L_a$  would not become unlike the other members of A if they too were forgetting at the same time. Thus the figure portrays hypotheses some of which would probably apply only in dynamic equilibria.

The kind of linguistic change we have been discussing up to now is change in language repertoires: who knows what language(s). Language planning that affects this kind of behavior is an example of 'language status planning'. The other type of language planning, 'language corpus planning', affecting the internal characteristics of languages, can also be hypothesized to be related to identity change.

Suppose that a policy of 'linguistic rapprochement' is in effect, and that it succeeds in making two languages resemble each other more than before. This has been one of the goals of some language planners in the Soviet Union, for example (see Baskakov 1969:208–209). It would be reasonable to place this development into our network of hypotheses shown in Figure 1, as a new variable. ' $L_a$  resembles  $L_b$ ' would have arrows reaching out to variables 12 ( $M_a$  can learn  $L_b$ ), 17 ( $M_a$  likes  $L_b$ ), 10 ( $M_a$  can communicate with B), 6 ( $M_a$  thinks like  $M_b$ 's) and 4 ( $M_a$  resembles  $M_b$ 's). Another variant of language corpus planning is standardization, which codifies a uniform variety of a language and promotes its use at the expense of its dialects. In this case, the variables in the figure can be redefined to refer to different dialects and dialect-speaking groups rather than languages and language groups, if the identity groups are in fact characterized by different dialects.

The converse of this reasoning applies to policies of linguistic differentiation: attempts to make one language or dialect diverge from another. This type of policy is common in history. The movement for Nynorsk (new Norwegian), the *Öz Türkçe* (pure Turkish) movement, the movement for Québécois as a literary language, the Soviet policy of standardizing many Turkic languages and the attempt to differentiate Hindi and Urdu are a few examples. Often these movements and policies are accompanied by rhetoric demonstrating the belief that linguistic differentiation is a potent reinforcer for a continued separate identity (see Pool 1976).

Many of the characteristics of a given language are positively or negatively evaluated by its speakers and others. These include both the external characteristics (e.g., the use of the language in official documents) and the internal characteristics (lexical, phonological, syntactic) of the language. Therefore, the manipulation of languages to change their characteristics can affect the prestige they enjoy and the ways they are perceived (e.g., as a 'developed' vs. 'primitive' language), thereby also affecting people's behavior toward them (Stewart 1968). One such effect would be to change the perceived utility of a language. ' $M_a$  perceives  $L_b$  as useful' could be added to Figure 1, with arrows going to variables 15 ( $M_a$  wants to learn  $L_b$ ), 17 ( $M_a$  likes  $L_b$ ) and 13 ( $M_a$  would benefit from coalitions with  $M_b$ s). Policies affecting the utility of a language could be expected to influence group identity through these paths.

The notion of 'group' has been left abstract in this discussion so as not to restrict the range of the hypotheses unnecessarily. We have been assuming a 'society' containing groups, and it is ethnic groups which come most naturally to mind. But when relations across the boundaries of countries reach a volume or an importance that makes us think of a region (e.g., Western Europe) or of the entire world as a society, the analytical framework can still be applied. Policies on the teaching of foreign languages, the development of scientific terminology and linguistic purification often refer to interstate rather than intrastate linguistic influences and aim to strengthen or erode particular interstate solidarities.

Whatever the society to which we refer — whether a valley, a country, a region or the world — the relevant population need not be conceptualized as divided into discrete groups of which each person belongs to just one and each of which has only one language. One of the main divergences from this simple situation is the presence of a lingua franca, which may belong to a collection of groups rather than, or in addition to, a single group. Here, however, the identification of a language with a supra-group may be subjective. Although there is no doubt as to what the general language of the Soviet people is, there is considerable doubt as to the language of the people of India. And there is no consensus as to the language of Europe or the language of the world. But language learning and higher-order identity (Soviet man, world citizen, etc.) may still be linked by the associations that a person perceives between particular languages and particular supra-groups. What a network of hypotheses such as ours cannot hope to deal with satisfactorily is the interferences that would take place when a language has multiple group associations. English, for example, may be perceived as the language of international contacts, of the United States, of most people in



Canada and/or of a minority in Quebec by a French-speaking Québécois, and one may react differently to these four associations. In such cases, language behavior may be modified (and defended) by emphasizing one association at the expense of another. Russian, for example, is more often described as the language of communication among the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. than as the language of the Russian people when its learning by non-Russians in that country is promoted. Languages are sometimes even renamed to help encourage one of the possible associations: Hindustani, Bahasa Indonesia and Philippino are examples of names emphasizing an association with the nation-state.

#### LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY: THE PROBLEM OF ASPECT

The policy-maker who wants to use either language or identity to influence the other one needs to know whether all aspects of language and all aspects of identity operate in the same way and are equally effective tools of manipulation or whether different aspects of them have different effects. Language competence, for example, may be related to identity with different strengths, depending on when it is acquired. Is a person's native language more important for identity, which remains largely unchanged by later language-learning or language-forgetting experiences? Or does identity continue to change as a person's language repertoire changes? If we compare recent data from Wales and Quebec, we receive the impression that the answer to this question differs in different countries.

In Wales, what seems to matter more is the earliest language behavior of the individual. This inference comes from Table 1, where the ethnic identities of three groups are compared: those whose parents both knew Welsh and who themselves know Welsh; those whose parents knew no Welsh and who themselves know no Welsh; and those whose parents both knew no Welsh, but who themselves do know Welsh. The data in the table come from a survey of 417 adults, randomly selected from an urban and a rural area of Wales in 1971.<sup>2</sup> When we compare the percentages in each group claiming a British, a Welsh or a mixed ethnic identity, we see that the linguistically mobile group — those who know Welsh even though their parents did not — have a distribution of identities almost the same as (and, statistically, not significantly different from) those whose parental linguistic situation is like theirs but very different from those whose current linguistic situation is like theirs. Since the language competence of parents tends to be reflected in the native-language competence of their children (i.e., the language or

languages they first learn to understand and/or speak), it appears that native-language competence is more important for identity than is second-language competence in Wales.<sup>3</sup>

Table 1. *Language and ethnic identity: Wales*

		Knows any Welsh?		
		No	Yes	
Parents knew Welsh? <sup>1</sup>		No	No	Yes
Ethnic identity	British	48%	41%	11%
	Mixed	25	26	13
	Welsh	27	33	76
N		135	39	191
		$\chi^2 = 0.813$ , 2df, not signif.		$\chi^2 = 30.0$ , 2df, $p < 0.001$

<sup>1</sup>'No' = neither; 'Yes' = both.

In Canada, however, the opposite is the case. There a person's current language behavior is better than his native language as a predictor of his ethnic identity. This is shown in Table 2, based on data from a survey of 4071 Canadians in 1965.<sup>4</sup> There are 125 respondents who have English as their native language but French as their main language at present or vice versa. Which language they shifted to is a better predictor of their ethnic identity than which language they shifted from. Thus, an English-Canadian identity is more likely among those who have shifted from French to English than among those shifting from English to French. And shifters from English to French are more likely to have a French-Canadian identity than shifters from French to English.

Table 2. *Language and ethnic identity: Canada*

		Own main home language			
		English		French	
Parents' main home language		English	French	English	French
Ethnic Identity	English	63%	9%	0%	0%
	Mixed rejected, other	37	75	35	21
	French	0	16	65	79
N		1723	108	17	1398

Another question of aspect is whether a person's primary language is the only one associated with his identity or whether his degree of competence in a second language is also relevant. Data from both Wales and Canada indicate that the latter is the case. Identity is related to how well a person knows another language, not just which language he mainly speaks. Table 3 shows that among people in Wales who speak mainly English at home, the likelihood of identifying oneself as Welsh is almost twice as great when a person knows how to speak the Welsh language well as when he has no competence in the language. Conversely, English-speaking monolinguals in Wales are even more than twice as likely to call themselves British as are English-speakers who also know how to speak Welsh well.

Table 3. *Second language competence and ethnic identity: Wales*

		Persons with English as main home language competence in Welsh		
		None	Low	High
Ethnic identity	British	46%	31%	20%
	Mixed	25	25	28
	Welsh	28	44	52
N		153	55	25

The pattern is similar in Canada. The Canadian survey included enough respondents that we can analyze this relationship separately for those with different native languages. Take those with English as their native language (inferred from the fact that both parents spoke English as their only main language). The vast majority of these persons still speak English as their main language. But the better they also know how to speak French, the less likely they are to identify themselves as English-Canadians. Those with a good speaking knowledge of French are less than half as likely to have an English-Canadian identity as are those who cannot speak any French. This is shown in Table 4.

As Table 5 shows, respondents with French as their (presumed) native language who have kept it as their current main home language are more likely to retain their French-Canadian ethnic identity (89%) if they speak no English at all; if they can speak English, the better they do so the less likely they are to keep their identity. Those able to speak English well are three times as likely to have dropped their (assumed) French-Canadian identity as those unable to speak any English. Identity, then, is related not only to the

Table 4. *Second-language competence and ethnic identity: Canada (native English-speakers)*

		Competence in French				
		None	Low	Medium	High	Native-like
Ethnic identity	English	67%	62%	53%	33%	15%
	Mixed, rejected, other	33	38	47	65	42
	French	0	0	0	1	42
N		1055	306	293	69	26

Table 5. *Second-language competence and ethnic identity: Canada (native French-speakers)*

		Competence in English				
		None	Low	Medium	High	Native-like
Ethnic identity	English	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%
	Mixed, rejected, other	11	13	19	33	75
	French	89	87	81	67	18
N		330	218	398	452	169

main language spoken, but also to the level of competence a person has in another (or perhaps more than one other) language.

If different aspects of language relate differently to identity, then why should not different aspects of identity relate differently to language? They should and they do. Let us consider two important varieties of identity: (1) ethnic self-appellation and (2) the political commanding primary loyalty. The data shown so far deal with the first type of identity. Are preferences for membership in one or another political community also associated with language? Among residents of Wales, the answer is yes. As Table 6 shows, the broader a Welsh person's linguistic repertoire is, the more likely he is to favor the separation of Wales from Britain and the less likely he is to favor bringing Wales closer to Britain. This table includes only those giving clear and consistent answers to three different questions about the best constitutional status for Wales. Yet this relationship is not as strong as that between language repertoire and ethnic identity. A comparison of Tables 6 and 7 makes clear that ethnic identity is more closely associated with language than is political identity.<sup>5</sup> Quebec reveals a similar pattern. Both political

identity and ethnic identity are related to language repertoire, but the latter relationship is considerably stronger. Tables 8 and 9 provide the data.

Table 6. *Language repertoire and political identity: Wales*

		Language repertoire			
		English	2	3	Welsh
Political identity <sup>1</sup>	British	43%	39%	26%	12%
	Mixed	19	15	9	22
	Welsh	38	45	65	65
N		91	33	34	107

<sup>1</sup>'British' = for the status quo or more integration of Wales into Britain; 'mixed' = for more decentralized decision-making within the present constitution; 'Welsh' = for Welsh autonomy within Britain or Welsh separation from Britain.

Table 7. *Language repertoire and ethnic identity: Wales*

		Language repertoire <sup>1</sup>			
		English	2	3	Welsh
Ethnic identity	British	46%	31%	20%	9%
	Mixed	25	25	31	9
	Welsh	28	44	49	82
N		153	55	51	153

<sup>1</sup>'English' = English main home language, no Welsh competence; '2' = English main home language, low Welsh competence; '3' = English main home language, high Welsh competence or English and Welsh main home languages; 'Welsh' = Welsh main home language.

Table 8. *Language repertoire and political identity: Quebec*

		English competence <sup>1</sup>									
		NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	HI	MM	LO	NO	
		French competence <sup>1</sup>									
		NO	LO	MM	HI	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	
Political identity <sup>2</sup>	Canadian	18%	15%	17%	19%	8%	11%	11%	12%	17%	
	Mixed	72	74	71	59	64	48	45	46	61	
	Québécois	8	11	11	22	28	42	45	42	22	
N		83	85	150	54	25	187	186	105	155	

<sup>1</sup>'NL' = native-like; 'HI' = high; 'MM' = medium; 'LO' = low; 'NO' = none.

<sup>2</sup>'Canadian' = for more federal control of Quebec; 'Mixed' = for the status quo; 'Québécois' = for less federal control of Quebec or separation of Quebec.

Table 9. *Language repertoire and ethnic identity: Quebec*

		English competence	NL	NL	NL	NL	NO	HI	MM	LO	NO
		French competence	NO	LO	MM	HI	NO	NL	NL	NL	NL
Ethnic identity	English	51%	57%	46%	27%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	Mixed, rejected, other	49	43	54	69	70	28	17	14	12	
	French	0	0	0	4	25	72	83	86	88	
N		102	104	175	71	40	269	274	174	323	

Where Wales and Quebec differ, however, is in the relationship between political identity and language repertoire among those having an ethnic identity associated with the territory itself. In Wales, those who identify themselves as Welsh tend to be less separatist if they speak English better ( $\tau_c = .09$ ;  $p \approx .05$ ). But in Quebec, those identifying themselves as French-Canadians tend to be *more* separatist if they speak English better ( $\tau_c = -.11$ ;  $p \approx .001$ ).

#### THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY PLANNING

Even with the most complete knowledge about how they interact, the manipulation of language through identity or of identity through language would have limits. One set of limits is imposed by the only partial relevance that language and identity have for each other. Their relationships are stronger in some countries than others; inspection of the above tables will reveal that the language-identity relationship is much stronger in Canada than in Wales, for example. The rate of English identification has a wide range depending on a person's original and current language situation in Canada: from 0% to 63% (Table 2). But in Wales, the range is narrower: from 11% to 48% (Table 1). The rate of French-Canadian identification likewise goes both lower and higher than Welsh identification.

The importance of language as a correlate of ethnic identity in Canada is clearer still if compared with other correlates of identity. The two main ethnic groups are considered to differ not only in language but also in where they live, what religions they have, whether their last names are French or not, what their ancestral national origins are, etc. We can see how important

language is compared with these other factors if we look at the ethnic identities of persons whose language belongs to one ethnic group but who have another factor belonging to the other group. With two factors pushing these people in opposite directions, it will be apparent which factor pushes more strongly. Table 10 shows that when language pushes against each of the four factors just mentioned, language pushes harder. More people always identify with the group associated with their language than with the group associated with their residence, religion, name or ancestry.

Table 10. *Ethnic identity of persons with countervailing characteristics: Canada*

Combination of characteristics <sup>1</sup>	Ethnic identity <sup>2</sup>			
	English	Mixed, rejected, other	French	N
L = E, home = Quebec	49%	49%	2%	428
L = F, home ≠ Quebec	0	33	67	439
L = E, religion = Catholic	40	56	4	574
L = F, religion = Prot.	8	33	58	12
L = E, name French	35	61	5	356
L = F, name not French	1	31	68	210
L = E, ancestry French	18	69	12	154
L = F, ancestry British	5	21	74	43

<sup>1</sup> 'L' = main home language; 'E' = English; 'F' = French; 'name' = last name as classified by surveying organization for sampling; 'ancestry' = patrilineal ancestry; 'British' = English, Scottish, Irish, Welsh.

<sup>2</sup> Figures in this table are percentages of row sums.

The relationship between language and identity varies in strength not only from one country to another but also from one group to another within a country. As Tables 1 and 2 show, in both Canada and Wales people whose parental and current language repertoire is at the minority-language end of the continuum are very likely to have a minority ethnic identity: 76% in Wales and 79% in Canada. But people at the majority-language end of the continuum are not so likely to have a majority ethnic identity: 48% in Wales and 63% in Canada. The same holds true for language switchers in Canada: those switching from English to French are very likely to adopt a French-Canadian identity (65%), but those switching from French to English are most likely to reject either identity (75%) rather than adopt an English one (9%).

If, in a given country, members of the majority group who learn a minority language also change their identity by disaffiliating psychologically

with their original group while members of a minority group do not respond in the analogous fashion when they learn the majority language, the reason may lie partly in variable 18 of Figure 1: the need to justify language competence. A minority group member's knowledge of the majority language can have an instrumental justification: the language may be a key to opportunity or, conversely, the refusal to learn it may be punished by the authorities (see Johnstone 1969:83–87). But whatever the explanation, such different responses to language learning can have obvious implications for identity planning. It may in principle be more difficult to teach a language of a few to many than to teach the language of the many to a few, but the effect of the former on identity would be greater. Furthermore, in line with Kelman's (1971) reasoning the growth of a united identity might be promoted if the majority's natural advantage were compensated for by a policy under which the majority had to learn the minority's language instead of vice versa.

We do not have enough evidence to take Kelman's position that all openly identity-motivated language policy will probably be counterproductive, but at least we can say that the feasibility of language-based manipulations of identity, and of identity-based language planning, probably varies greatly from country to country and from group to group.

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#### NOTES

1. See Fishman (1974). Periodicals include *Language Planning Newsletter* (East-West Center, Honolulu) and *Language Problems and Language Planning* (Mouton, The Hague).
2. These were North Cardiff and South Caernarvonshire, respectively. Half the respondents lived in each of these constituencies. The survey was conducted by Raymond R. Corrado, to whom I am very grateful for making the data available.
3. The group of persons whose parents knew Welsh but who themselves knew no Welsh is almost non-existent (three persons) and is therefore omitted from this table.
4. The survey was conducted by the Groupe de recherches sociales for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.
5. The exclusion of 147 respondents from Table 7 on the grounds of unclear or inconsistent responses may have altered the proportions but probably in the direction of making the relationship stronger by decreasing random-like responses. Hence the difference in strength between the two relationships might have been still greater if more precise measurement had been used.

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## Abstract

Language planning has become a common notion, but identity planning has not. Yet many hypotheses link language and identity, implying that identity planning may be a deliberate or accidental result of language planning and may also be a means to it.

Hypothesized mechanisms whereby language and identity affect each other become complex as soon as a few intervening variables are introduced. A system of 18 linguistic, identificational, communicational, affective, and cognitive variables linked by 78 causal hypotheses illustrates this complexity and raises further questions about additional variables and how interpersonal differences in perception affect language and identity behavior.

Different aspects of language behavior are differently related to different aspects of identity as well. As an example, survey data reveal that identity is more strongly associated with current main language in Canada, but with native language in Wales. Political identity is related to language repertoire in both places, but oppositely; separatism varies with linguistic Welshness but inversely with linguistic Frenchness. And language is more strongly associated with identity in Canada than in Wales, but in both a minority identity is more likely among the linguistic minority than is a majority identity among the linguistic majority.